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HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE: A STUDY OF
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter "the Federal Circuit") was established in 1982 through the
Federal Courts Improvement Act.1 The Federal Circuit was created
2
to achieve uniformity and stability in the application oi patent laws
and prevent forum shopping abuses in patent litigation.3 In addition, proponents hoped the new court would help alleviate the
overburdened regional circuit courts, "where the technical nature
of patent disputes required a disproportionate amount of time from
the generalist judges...,,4
To accomplish this, the Federal Circuit has been granted the exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction over all appeals involving patent issues from both the federal district courts and the Patent and
Trademark Office.' However, Congress did not make the Federal
Circuit's patent jurisdiction specialized in the literal sense of possessing jurisdiction in only a single area of law. Instead, Congress
supplemented the court's adjudicatory authority by granting jurisdiction in several specified fields.6 More importantly, pendent jurisdiction allows this patent court to hear appeals over such diverse
issues as tort claims, unfair competition and antitrust regulation.7
This note will analyze the history and jurisprudence of the Federal
Circuit in antitrust enforcement. First, the natural starting point for
such an analysis must be the grant and application of the jurisdiction
of the Federal Circuit to hear antitrust issues. Second, this note dis1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (Codified as amended in various sections of
28 U.S.C. (1988)).
2. See Hale, The "Arising Under" Jurisdictionof the Federal Circuit: An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. STATE L.R v. 229, 238 (1986).
3. See Commission on Revision of the FederalCourt Appellate System, Struc-

hure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 21920 (1975) (discussing problems of forum shopping in patent cases).
4. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U.L.Rzv. 1, 7 (1989) [hereinafter; Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit] (an excellent
case study in which Professor Dreyfuss compliments and criticizes both the Federal
Circuit Court and specialized courts in general).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1),(4) (1988).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)-(7) (1988). Including, but not limited to, certain
trademark appeals (28 U.S.C. § 1 295(a)(4)), specified claims involving the government (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2)), international trade appeals (28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(5),(6)), and technology transfer regulations (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(7))
(1988).
7. While these areas are not specified in the grant of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a), interpretation of this statute and the well-pleaded complaint rule has enabled the court to adjudicate pendent claims. Explained infra notes 8-48 and accompanying text.
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cusses forum shopping and the choice of law requirements for an
appellate court with multi-regional jurisdiction. The third section
surveys the Federal Circuit jurisprudence with respect to several
prominent substantive antitrust issues and then explains the onesided result. Despite the Federal Circuit's consistent findings that no
antitrust violation has occurred, this note concludes that the jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit parallels antitrust enforcement
throughout the government. Also, this note shows that the aims of
the intellectual property laws are actually in accord with the goals
of the antitrust laws--each promoting innovation, development of
industry and improved consumer welfare.
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION OVER ANTITRUST
ISSUES

The Federal Circuit derives its specialized jurisdiction from 28
U.S.C. § 1295. This jurisdictional grant allows the court to hear appeals from any case where the district court jurisdiction was based,
"in whole or in part", on a patent claim.8 Because of the vague terminology, "in whole or in part" and "arising under" in the statutes,
the court's jurisdiction and its corresponding ability to rule on nonpatent issues, such as antitrust claims, is often litigated. Case law
has been inconsistent, sometimes ruling for an expansive interpretation and other times finding a narrow interpretation.
A. Expansive Interpretation
On the expansive side, it has been argued that a broad interpretation of this statute would grant subject matter jurisdiction for every
issue, in any case, that may have any patent questions, no matter
how indirect or insubstantial that question may be.9 Under this interpretation, the Federal Circuit uses legislative intent to reject specific issue jurisdiction and rule on all collateral issues in a case. The
"based in part" language has even been interpreted to grant jurisdiction to actions brought by a plaintiff in federal district court
under the antitrust laws where the defendant counterclaimed with a
patent infringement claim.1 0
In Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc.," the court addressed the jurisdiction
issue in affirming the First Circuit Court of Appeals holding that "jurisdiction lies with the Federal Circuit because defendant Atex by
counterclaim [to antitrust charges,] charged Xeta with infringement
of [a] United States patent...,, 2 Similarly, in In re Innotron Diag
nostics,'3 plaintiff Innotron Diagnostics ("Innotron") sued Abbott
Laboratories ("Abbott") in a California district court alleging that
Abbott's marketing activities violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act (the "Sherman Act"). 4
8. Section 1295 reads, in pertinent part: "The United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction... of an appeal from a final
decision of a district court of the United States ... ifthe jurisdiction of that court
was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338." 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
In turn, Section 1338 reads, in pertinent part, "(a) The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction over any civil action arising under any Act
of Congress relating to patents .. " 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
9. See Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit,supra note 4 at 31 (1989).
10. See, e.g., In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Xeta,
Inc., v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
11. 852 F.2d 1280.
12. Id., 852 F.2d at 1281.
13. 800 F.2d 1077.
14. Id. at 1078. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, Abbott's sales contracts required
purchase of additional products (tying and bundling) and Abbott intentionally
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As a separate action and then consolidated as a compulsory counterclaim, Abbott sued Innotron for infringement of a patented product which tested for substances in a patient's blood."5 Despite later
severance of the patent and antitrust issues before appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction over all of the issues.
The Court stated that the district court jurisdiction over the original
patent infringement claim was based in whole on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) and that "consolidat[ion] ... was entirely procedural...
and in no way ousted the district court of jurisdiction over that complaint under § 1338(a)." 16 The Federal Circuit must therefore17 exercise its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the entire case.
As Innotron illustrates, the Federal Circuit uses a broad definition
of the term case to refer to proceedings at the complaint stage.
Likewise, in Atari, Inc. v. I S & A Group, Inc.,' 8 plaintiff filed a single case with one patent claim and six non-patent claims. J S & 4,
Group, Inc. answered with seven affirmative defenses including an
attempt to monopolize. Despite later separation orders, the Federal
Circuit determined it had jurisdiction over appeals from decisions in
cases in which the district court's jurisdiction was based in part on
§ 1338, and rejected the argument that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction only over judgments on the separated patent claims. 19 By
analogizing the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to federal "arising
under" jurisdiction,2" the "court's potential appellate jurisdiction
over a case... should initially attach at the complaint stage of the
manipulated its software to exclude plaintiff's products, both in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
15. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1078-79.
16. Id. at 1080. The Federal Circuit went on to state that the consolidation
would have the same jurisdictional status if Abbott's patent claim were filed as a
compulsory counterclaim. "Thus, whether allegations of patent infringement be
filed and maintained as a viable, non-frivolous counterclaim in a non-patent case,
or as a separate complaint which is then consolidated with the nonpatent case, the
district court's jurisdiction is [still] 'based in part' on § 1338(a)...." Id.
17. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1080; 28 U.S.C. § 1295(2)(1).
18. 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
19. Id. at 1430-31.
20. The phrase appears in the United States Constitution which provides that
"Itihe judicial power shall extend to all cases... arising under this Constitution, [or]
the laws of the United States. .. "(U.S. Const. art. M, § 2, cl. 1.). Though there is no
clear definition of "arising under", the Supreme Court has used the well-pleaded
complaint rule, which requires that a question of federal law appear on the face of
the complaint, to determine federal "arising under" jurisdiction. As Justice Holmes
stated, "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well
Works Co. v. Layne Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916)(cited in Atari, 747 F.2d at
1429, "A claim arises under the particular statute which creates the cause of action
... "). See also Christianson v. Colt, 822 F.2d 1544, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1987), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
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district court proceeding.
More recently, the Federal Circuit found it had jurisdiction to review final determinations of an antitrust counterclaim to patent infringement claims, despite the fact that the patent phase of the case
had been dismissed and the determination was final.2 2 The Federal
Circuit determined it had jurisdiction because the district court case
was based in part on § 1338 and "if the district court had decided
the antitrust question before deciding the patent question, [the Federal Circuit] would have had jurisdiction of an appeal challenging
the antitrust ruling."'23 The Court concluded that its jurisdiction
should not depend on the order
in which the district court decided
24
the patent and antitrust issues.

B.

Restrictive Interpretation

On the other hand, in a somewhat irreconcilable manner, the Federal Circuit has also taken a restrictive approach toward its own jurisdiction. This is due in part to prevent forum manipulation by
adding or severing patent claims, and in part to accomplish the Federal Circuit's legislative purpose of administering patent law.
It is easy to see how a simple contract case regarding the proper
ownership of a patent should not be appealable to the Federal Circuit. In the lower court case of Beglhin-Say Int'l, Inc. v. Ole-Bendt
Rasmussen,25 plaintiff's claim was not based in whole or in part on
§ 1338 but rather was a case involving state contract law. 26 The
Federal Circuit cannot be used as another avenue for a preferable
forum for state law claims.
Other cases that have been retransferred from the Federal Circuit
for lack of jurisdiction involved patent claims that have been dismissed or concluded before appeal to the Federal Circuit Court.2 7
21. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1436. In applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
22. Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
23. Id. at 420. The parties stipulated that if the patent was invalid, then the
defendant was entitled to recover on its antitrust counterclaim. The lower court
determination of patent invalidity was not appealed. However, the invalidity of a
patent does not in and of itself, establish an antitrust violation. The Federal Circuit
therefore vacated the district court's finding of an antitrust violation and remanded
for further factual development.
24. Id. But see infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
25. 733 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
26. Plaintiff's action sounded exclusively in contract since the sole question
raised by the complaint was whether certain contracts 'should be interpreted as having conveyed title to two U.S. patents. No questions under the patent laws were
present in the complaint. Thus, the action did not "arise under" any act of Congress relating to patents within the meaning of the applicable jurisdictional statute.
Id. at 1570-71.
27. See Schwarzkopf Dev. Corp. v. Ti-Coating, Inc., 800 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir.
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In Scbwarzkopf Dev. Corp. v. Ti-Coating,Inc.,28 the Federal Circuit
noted that where patent counterclaims have been dismissed at the
pleading stage, dismissal being final and not appealable, appeal
from judgment on the non-patent issues did not lie in the Federal
Circuit. That case focused on a Senate report which used antitrust
issues as an example of the Federal Circuit jurisdiction:
Thus, for example, mere joinder of a patent claim in a case
whose gravamen is antitrust should not be permitted to avail a
plaintiff of the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.... Federal district judges are encouraged to use their authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure... to insure the integrity of the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeals by separating final
decisions on claims involving substantial antitrust issues from trivial patent claims,2 lor]
counterclaims... raised to manipulate appel9
late jurisdiction.
The Senate report continued:
The committee intends for the jurisdictional language to be construed in accordance with the objectives of the [Federal Courts
Improvement) Act and these concerns. If, for example, a patent
claim is manipulatively joined to an antitrust action but severed or
dismissed before final decision of the antitrust claim, jurisdiction
over the appeal of the antitrust claim should not be changed by
this Act but should rest with the regional court of appeals.3 °
It is difficult to reconcile this logic with the determinations that the
Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over those cases where the antitrust
issues were separated or severed from the patent issues,3 1 or the patent phase of the case had been finally determined. 2 However, the
latter all involved, at least initially, nonfrivolous viable patent
claims. On the other hand, voluntary dismissal of the patent claims
by a party could be viewed as an amended complaint and therefore
no patent issues existed during the complaint stage.
This restrictive view of Federal Circuit jurisdiction in non-patent
cases is most noted in the antitrust action of Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.3 3 In that case, the jurisdictional issue was
1986); Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 836 F.2d 515 (Fed. Cir. 1987); USM
Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 770 F.2d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
28. 800 F.2d 240.
29. S. Rep. No. 180, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 19-20, reprintedin 1982 U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin. News, 29-30.
30. Id. at 20, 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 30.

31. See In re Innotron, 800 F.2d 1077, supra note 14 and accompanying text;
Atari, 747 F.2d 1422, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
32. See Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417, supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
33. 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 486 U.S. 800
(1988), on remand, 870 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 81

(1989).
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whether a judgment could be appealed to the Federal Circuit when
the complaint alleged only antitrust and tort violations, but where
resolution focused exclusively on a single question of patent law.
The Federal Circuit ruled on the jurisdiction issue twice before the
case went on to the Supreme Court.3 ' Initially, the Federal Circuit,
using a traditional "arising under" jurisdiction analysis refused the
appeal based on the well-pleaded complaint rule.3 5 The plaintiff's
complaint sought recovery because Colt Industry ("Colt") put Chris36
tianson's company out of business by organizing a group boycott,
and illegally extending their monopoly position by using a questionable trade secrets claim to conceal technology. The complaint alleged only antitrust violations as its cause of action despite
legitimate questions of patent law and trade secrets interpretation. 7
The Court explained, "[i]n sum, what counts is not the mere presence or absence of 'patent issues'; what counts is whether the district
court's jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on section
1338.113' 8 The Federal Circuit concluded it did not have appellate
jurisdiction despite a motion for summary judgment on a patent law
"question", since the cause of action and the claim for relief arose
under antitrust laws and not patent laws.39
After transfer to the proper appellate court and retransfer back to
the Federal Circuit, the court reiterated their lack of jurisdiction, but
decided to hear the appeal "in the interest of justice."'40 Upon the
34. 484 U.S. 985 (1987)(cert. granted).
35. Christianson,822 F.2d at 1549. Christianson's antitrust action was not one
"arising under" the patent laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1338. See supra notes 19-21.
36. Id. at 1557.
37. Id. The validity of the trade secret in question was to be determined by
patent law requirements. If production advances need not have been disclosed at
the time of the patent application, the trade secrets were valid, and accordingly,
any anti-competitive conduct with respect to those secrets was permissible. However, if U.S. patent law required disclosure (35 U.S.C. § 3112), then the trade
secrets in question lose state law protection and Colt could be found liable for
antitrust violations.
38. Christianson, 822 F.2d at 1553. Using a traditional "arising under" jurisdiction analysis, the court stated that whether an action arises under federal law "must
be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement ... unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is
thought the defendant may interpose." Id. at 1553 (emphasis supplied).
39. Id. at 1554.
40. Id. at 1559. Pursuant to the "interest of justice" provision in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631, the court balanced the needs of the parties against the institutional costs of
deciding the case. Re-re-transfer would subject the parties to a continuation of the
back-and-forth battering with nothing to preclude further transfers and'greater delay. Alternatively, dismissal of the case would risk leaving the parties with no avenue of appellate review (unless the Supreme Court were to grant a petition for
certiorari). Consequently, despite a strong sense of discomfort, the court determined that a rule of necessity and the interest of justice due the parties compels
resolving the merits of the appeal.
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Federal Circuit appellate ruling on the merits in favor4 of
the monop2
olist, 4 1 certiorari was granted to the Supreme Court.
First, the Supreme Court rejected hearing of appeals "in the interest of justice," on the grounds that a court can never extend its own
subject matter jurisdiction. 43 Also, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit on the jurisdictional issue. 4 4 The Supreme Court
went further. In an attempt to add consistency to Federal Circuit
jurisprudence and reduce unpredictable and burdensome litigation
to the parties, the Supreme Court held in dicta that the decision of
the transferor court is the law of the case.4" Based on this, the Federal Circuit is now foreclosed from reconsidering another court's
pronouncement of its own jurisdiction.
C.

Summation of Jurisdiction

In summation, whether or not the Federal Circuit will entertain
appeals on antitrust issues in cases which began or continue with
viable patent issues is far from clear. The court will look into the
specific complaints for relief and counterclaims, but under Christianson, may be required to defer to the transferring courts. However, it is likely that the Federal Circuit will continue to determine
jurisdiction for themselves despite the opinion of the transferor
4 6

court.

In a recent appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction in an
antitrust action, 4 7 the Federal Circuit ruled on the merits, despite the
fact that patent counterclaims had not yet been pursued. While the
court stated it was following Christianson,and jurisdiction was the
decision of the transferor court, the Federal Circuit would have
reached the same decision following its own jurisprudence. In that
case, the district court action of Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc. was based in
part on § 1338 due to a nonfrivolous, viable counterclaim, an affirmative claim for relief at the complaint stage, which had not yet
been dismissed.4 s
41. Holding mass production technology need not be disclosed in a patent's
claim section and thereby validating the trade secrets-a ruling in favor of the monopolist. Id.
42. 484 U.S. 985 (1987) (cert.granted).
43. Christianson,486 U.S. at 818.

44. Id. Reiterating that jurisdiction is determined by the claims in the plaintiff's
complaint and not based on theories, support or defenses. Id. at 811.
45. Id. at 819. "Under the law-of-the-case principles, if the transferee court can
Howfind the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an end ....
ever, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the law-of-the-case may be disregarded, when the transferee court has a clear conviction of error. Id.
46. See supra note 45.
47. Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
48. Cf. In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077.
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II.

FORUM SHOPPING/CHOICE OF LAW
REQUIREMENTS

Whether due to Christianson, or an expansive or restrictive interpretation of the jurisdictional grant, it is clear that the Federal Circuit has been, and will continue to be, a forum for substantive
antitrust claims. In the few years of its existence, 49 the Federal Circuit has already decided such issues as: denial of a preliminary injunction against an alleged monopolist; s° when patent misuse, fraud
on the Patent Office, and wrongful patent enforcement will support
violations of the antitrust laws;5 1 when tying arrangements and other
forms of patent misuse are antitrust infractions;5 2 and what types of
pricing policies will be considered predatory pricing.5 3
It seems therefore that this grant of jurisdiction to hear pendent
antitrust issues opens up another avenue for forum shopping.
Where the Federal Circuit's substantive non-patent law differs from
that of the regional circuits, parties may be motivated to omit valid
ones to take advantage of the forum
patent claims or join frivolous
54
with the most favorable law.
However, as a court of appellate jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit
must apply the law of the regional circuit where the district court
sits.5 5 Therefore, a litigant seeking to avoid the antitrust jurisprudence of their regional circuit would not be advantaged by appeal
to the Federal Circuit. They would be subject to the same law and
interpretation. This eliminates many forum shopping abuses and
reduces the lure of manipulating patent and antitrust claims.
Problems arise, however, with such a choice of law principle
49. Established in 1982 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97164, 96 Stat. 25.
50. Xeta, 852 F.2d 1280; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897
F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
51. See infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text: "Walker Process Claims."
52. See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text: "Tying Arrangements."
53. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text: "Predatory Pricing."
The Federal Circuit has also entertained such issues as: standing, see Indium
Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1985), infra note 49; anticompetitive settlements, see CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 727 F.2d 1550 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); end pricing, see Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471
(Fed. Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987); and technology disclosure to
competitors, see Christianson v. Colt, 822 F.2d 1544, supra note 37. However,
those issues are not expanded in this note.
54. Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit,supra note 4, at 38 (discussing the problem of
forum shopping when the Federal Circuit adjudicates non-patent issues).
55. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "We
must approach a federal antitrust claim as would a court of appeals in the circuit of
the district court whose judgment we review." Id. See also infra notes 63, 67 and
accompanying text. But see Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882
(Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986) (applying Federal Circuit law
to antitrust standing question without considering choice of law issue).
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when the litigation involves multi-regional circuit laws 5 6 or when
the appropriate regional circuit has not entertained the same, or
even similar issues. When the regional circuit has not spoken, the
Federal Circuit must predict how that regional circuit would have
decided the issue in light of the decisions
of that circuit's various
7
district courts, public policy, etc.5
Also, the choice of law requirement is a significant restraint when
legal theories are rapidly changing. Cases involving patent and antitrust issues provide a good example of how difficult it might be to
incorporate theoretical changes into the law. During the 1980's,
competition policy has undergone substantial revision which should
affect both antitrust and patent enforcement.- 8 Consequently, if the
regional circuit has not had an opportunity to revise its position,
then the Federal Circuit is paralyzed-it cannot apply new theories
to antitrust claims, despite the fact that its own analysis, in a differet
case, yields a different result.5 9 Despite these dangers, in each of
the following substantive analyses, the Federal Circuit has used the
interpretation and precedents of the regional circuit when forced to
decide antitrust issues.

III.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST SURVEY

Walker Process Claims (patentfraud context)

In the landmark case of Walker Process,6 ° the Supreme Court
held that the procurement of a patent by fraud on the Patent Office,
and the intentional enforcement of such a fraudulent patent or any
other patent known to be invalid may violate § 2 of the Sherman Act
56. The Federal Circuit may be faced with choosing between two or more bodies of law. See, e.g., Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., 785 F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (choice of Fourth Circuit law, as opposed to Sixth Circuit law made with
little discussion). This case began in Ohio (Sixth Circuit), however, the order being
appealed (quashing of subpoena) was issued by a district court in the Fourth
Circuit.
57. Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit,supra note 4, at 42. "In such cases, the [Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] is left with the arduous (if not pointless) task of
reading the other circuit's opinions on related matters and guessing how the judges
would decide the open question." Id. at 42. See also Heat & Control, 785 F.2d at
1022 n.4, "With respect to the issues on which the Fourth Circuit has not spoken,
we must predict how it would decide those questions were they before that court."
58. See Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit,supra note 4, at 43.
59. For example, similar factual disputes appealed from two different circuits,
one of which has recently adopted modern changes in antitrust or patent law, might
yield different results. Cf. Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 779
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting the strange situation where a district court judge will not
be bound by the precedents of his own Court of Appeals. "That is the situation
created by Congress in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 402 of
Pub. L. 97-164, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 37, effective Oct. 1, 1982.").
60. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965).
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provided that all other elements needed to establish a § 2 monopolization charge are proven.6" (Hereinafter referred to as "Walker
Process Claims.") Proof of intentional fraud in obtaining or enforcing a patent would deprive a legally granted monopoly of its exemption from the antitrust laws. Therefore, those and other acts by a
party with requisite monopoly power (in the relevant market) could
be found to be guilty of attempted monopolization in violation of § 2
faith efforts by a patentee
of the Sherman Act. However, good
6 2
would furnish a complete defense.
This issue has repeatedly gone to the Federal Circuit due to the
continuing viability of both the claim for validity (or invalidity) of
the patent, and the pendent antitrust violation claim.63 Often the
patent holder claims infringement and the competitor counterclaims
with invalidity and antitrust violations. Remarkably, despite often
finding the necessary intentional fraud on the patent office or fraudulent prosecution of an invalid patent to hold the patent unenforceable, the Federal Circuit has never held such action in violation of
the Sherman Act.
In Argus Chemical, 4 the Federal Circuit declined to extend the
Walker Process claim for antitrust violations. In that case, Argus
Chemical ("Argus") sued Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., ("Fibre-Glass")
for patent infringement and Fibre-Glass defended with claims for
patent invalidity and attempted monopolization due to the procuring
and enforcing of an invalid patent. Despite finding the patent invalid for failure to disclose material information, the Federal Circuit
held that this was not the level of inequitable conduct required for
antitrust violations.65
1. Fraudulent Procurement of a Patent
The Federal Circuit, in Argus Chemical, stated that failure to disclose any material information that should have been disclosed to
the Patent Office renders a patent unenforceable despite the fact
that such nondisclosure was made in good faith. Since Argus failed
to disclose the material fact of sales made before the filing the pat61. Id. at 176. The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) The possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power. United States v. Grinnel Corp.,
236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964).
62. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177. For example, an honest mistake, see Argus Chemical Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text; cf. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg.
Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987), infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text
(honest mistake in patent misuse context).
63. Since both claims stem from a common.nucleus. of operative facts, they are
heard together in the same case.
64. 812 F.2d 1381.
65. Id. at 1384, 1386.
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ent application, the patent was invalid.6 6 However, the court then
stated that a higher level of inequitable conduct was required to
find antitrust violations in either the procurement or enforcement of
a patent.6 7 The Federal Circuit likened claims for invalidity and
unenforceability to "raising a shield"; as opposed to claims for antitrust damages which they likened to "unsheathing a sword".6"
Using the Ninth Circuit interpretation, 6 9 the level of fraud necessary to find antitrust violations is knowing and willful fraud on the
patent office. 70 This standard is far more stringent than that required to find a patent invalid. In applying Walker Process, the
Ninth Circuit had stated that inadvertent errors or honest mistakes
do not constitute fraud under Walker. "'[K]nowing and willful
fraud' as the term is used in Walker can be no less than clear, convincing proof of intentional fraud involving affirmative dishonesty, a
deliberately planned
and carefully executed scheme to defraud...
71
the Patent Office."1
This distinction between inequitable conduct that can lead to a
declaration of patent unenforceability, and fraud that is required for
antitrust damages under Walker Process, resulted in a series of
cases holding that an invalid patent monopoly does not rise to the
level of an antitrust violation. 2
2.

Fraudulent Enforcement of a Patent

Next the Federal Circuit addressed the alternative theory advanced by Fibre-Glass that Argus monopolized or attempted to monopolize commerce by bringing the present suit in bad faith. Based
on Walker Process, and the Ninth circuit case of Handgards," the

Federal Circuit acknowledged that prosecution of patent infringement suits in bad faith could constitute an attempt to monopolize.
However, like fraudulent procurement of a patent, an antitrust viola66. Id. at 1382.
67. Id.
68. FMC Corp. v. Manitowac Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
quoted in Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
69. "In deciding whether we should thus extend Walker Process, we look to the
law of the regional circuit in which this case was brought, here the Ninth Circuit."
Argus, 812 F.2d at 1384. See also supra note 55 and accompanying text: "Forum
Shopping/Choice of Law Requirements."
70. Argus, 812 F.2d at 1383.
71. Id. at 1384-85 (quoting Cataphone Corp. v. DeSoto Chemical Coatings,

Inc., 450 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1971)).
72. See Argus 812 F.2d 1381; Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Syss. Corp., 755 F.2d 158
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Karody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 825 F.2d 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1987); FMC Corp., 835 F.2d 1411.
73. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
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tion occurs only when there is knowing and willful wrongdoing in
the enforcement of an invalid patent. Antitrust liability is premised
upon a party's prosecution of a patent infringement suit with the
knowledge that its patent was invalid.7 4 Consequently, no antitrust
violation was found since Fibre-Glass could not prove that Argus
pursued its infringement action in bad faith."
Moreover, the Federal Circuit stated that "to prevail in an antitrust
claim based upon enforcement of an invalid or unenforceable patent.., the litigant must [overcome the presumption of patent validity
and] establish that the patentee acted in bad faith in enforcing the
patent because he knew that the patent was invalid."' 7 6 A patentee's
infringement suit is presumed to be brought in good faith and this
can be rebutted only by clear and convincing
presumption
7
evidence.

7

B.

Tying Arrangements (patentmisuse)

The grant of a patent creates a lawful monopoly extending only to
the claimed subject matter and the scope of the patent. A patentee
may misuse the patent by attempting to extend its monopoly beyond
the scope of the patent or beyond the claims stated. For example,
licensing beyond the term of the patent, or bundling 78 of patented
and unpatented products, are two forms of patent misuse. Like the
conduct required for fraudulent enforcement (Walker Process
Claim), patent misuse may rise to the level of an antitrust violation,
or, conduct which does not rise to such level may be sufficient to
invoke the doctrine as an affirmative defense to a charge of patent
infringement and render the patent unenforceable. 9
A tying arrangement, or tie in, is one form of patent misuse where
the sale or lease of one product (the "tying" product) is made on the
condition that the buyer or lessee take a second product (the "tied"
product) as well. The law against tying arrangements covers any
combination of sales or leases. Tying arrangements can be illegal
74. Id. at 990, 993.
75. Argus, 812 F.2d at 1386. The only evidence Fibre-Glass offered to support
its assertion that Argus brought the suit in bad faith is a letter from another competitor stating the patent is invalid. "The allegation by an accused infringer that the
patent is invalid-an assertion frequently made by those charged with infringement--cannot be turned into evidence that the patentee knew the patent was invalid when it instituted an infringement suit." Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added). See also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
77. Loctite,.781 F.2d at 876 (quoting Handgards, 601 F.2d at 996).
78. Bundling is a type of tying arrangement involving multiple patented and
unpatented products, where the seller or lessor requires purchase of all of the
products.
79. See Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280. See also Senza-Gel Corp. v.
Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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under the antitrust laws either as contracts in restraint of trade under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act8 ° or sometimes under the more explicit provisions of § 3 of the Clayton Act."1
1. Elements Articulated by the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit has recently restated the proposition that tying unpatented products to the purchase of patented products may
be an antitrust violation. 2 When a patent owner uses his patent
rights not only as a shield to protect his invention, but also as
a sword to eviscerate competition unfairly, that owner may be found
to have abused the grant and may become liable for an antitrust
violation when sufficient power in the relevant market is present.8 3
Therefore, a patent owner "may incur antitrust liability .... where a
license of a patent compels the purchase of unpatented
goods... ."84
In Xeta, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary
injunction on a claim of illegal tying,8 5 holding in favor of the monopolist. The Federal Circuit articulated the three elements that
must be demonstrated to prove anti-competitive tying. "First, the
purchase of one product.., must be conditioned on the purchase of
another product.., second, the defendant must have sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product; and third,
the amount of commerce affected must be 'not insubstantial'. 8 6 In
this case plaintiff Xeta had not shown a likelihood to prevail on
these issues. Because antitrust injunctions against a patent holder is
an extreme remedy, the injunction
was denied by the lower court
8 7
and the Federal Circuit.
2.

Required Level of Intent

In two other cases where the Federal Circuit considered the tying
arrangement issue, the court held no illegal tying existed, and there80. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) ("[e]very contract, combination... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce ... [is] illegal").
81. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). This section of the Clayton Act prohibits the making
of a lease, sale or contract for sale of goods or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
82. Xeta, 852 F.2d at 1282-83.
83. Id.
84. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1990), reh. den., No. 5205 (U.S. App. Apr. 4, 1990)(LEXIS, Genfed library).
85. While other claims were also included, the court stated that this was the
"principal claim." Xeta, 852 F.2d at 1283.
86. Xeta, 852 F.2d at 1282-83 (citing Northern Pacific By. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
87. Xeta, 852 F.2d at 1284-85.
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fore, conduct was neither patent misuse nor an antitrust violation."8
In Allen Archery the licensing of the Allen bow patent required the
licensee/distributor to pay royalties on "each and every replacement part sold by licensee for the reconstruction of said bows."8 9
The district court rejected the argument that Allen Archery misused
its patent because it collected royalties on parts that were used to
repair and not to reconstruct Allen bows, thereby exceeding the
proper scope of its patent rights. The lower court found the acceptance of royalties on repair parts was "the result of a mistake ... and
not the result of an intent to extend the patent monopoly to the unpatented repair parts." 90 The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that
"[tihere [was] no allegation that Allen [Archery] intended to collect
royalty payments for [unpatented] replacement parts ..... 91 There-,
fore, the2 collection of such royalties did not constitute misuse of the
9
patent.
Similarly in Senza-Gel, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court finding that no tying arrangement existed since the lessees voluntarily leased machines from the process patent holder.9 This implies that the lessees could have leased the machine from others and
still acquired the license to use the process from the patent holder
and thus the tie-in was not required.9 4
3.

Legislative Considerations

The Federal Circuit, as well as other courts, are less likely to find
tying to be a patent misuse and an antitrust violation in the future as
this interpretation of the requirements has been affirmed by Congress. In a 1988 amendment to the Patent Act 5 concerning the
doctrine of patent misuse, Congress enumerated certain business
practices that are permissible by a patent holder. According to the
amendment, conditioning arrangements and tying agreements are
no longer per se instances of patent misuse. Moreover, conduct involving conditioning of the patent rights constitutes patent misuse
only when "in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or the patented prod88. See Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
89. Allen Archery, 819 F.2d at 1097.
90. Id. at 1097. The acceptance of royalties was, as to repair parts, the result of
mistake and an inability to differentiate between repair and reconstruction parts.
91. Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 1098. However, the Federal Circuit conceded that such conduct, if
intentional, may be an antitrust violation. "[We intimate no view on whether a iicense that covered repair parts would be illegal as involving patent misuse." Id.
93. Senza-Gel, 803 F.2d at 668.

94. Id.
95. Pub. L. No. 100-703, Title II, Section 201, 102 Stat. 4676, (enacted on Nov.
19, 1988 amends 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)).
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uct on which the license or sale is conditioned.

'9 6

C. PredatoryPricing
Another antitrust issue that the Federal Circuit has been confronted with is predatory pricing. Predatory pricing refers to a firm's
attempt to drive a competitor out of business, or to discourage a potential competitor from entering the market by selling its output at
an artificially low price. Once the rival has been dispatched from
the market, the predator will be able to reap a profit from his monopoly which will more than pay for the losses incurred during the
predatory period.
The Xeta case included a claim for predatory pricing. 97 In support of a denial of a preliminary injunction against the alleged
predator, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the predatory intent
must be proven9 8 and stated that without such monopolistic intent a
competitor must be allowed to compete in the market place. 9 9
Therefore, it seems that the Federal Circuit would allow deference
toward a company's pricing decisions.
However, in the case of U.S. PhillipsCorp. v. Windmere Corp.,z°°
the Federal Circuit overruled a directed verdict in favor of the alleged monopolist and held that there was sufficient evidence to submit predatory pricing claims to a jury. This is one of the rare cases
when the Federal Circuit has ruled that there was, or may be, an
antitrust violation.
U.S. Phillips Corp. ("Phillips") sued Windmere ("Windmere")
and others for infringement of its electric razor patent and
Windmere counterclaimed alleging attempted monopolization in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court submitted the
patent (and unfair competition) issues to the jury but directed a verdict in favor of the alleged monopolist (Phillips) on the antitrust
counterclaim.' o3
Upon appeal, the Federal Circuit reexamined the evidence proffered by Windmere to support its antitrust claims stating that in directing a verdict, "[tihe evidence must be considered in the light
and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party op96. Id.
97. Xeta, 852 F.2d 1280. Discussed supra notes 82-87 in relation to plaintiff's
tying claim.

98. Following Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 277 (1st Cir.
1983).
99. Xeta, 852 F.2d at 1283. "Price competition is not itself an antitrust violation.... The law that prohibits predatory pricing practices does not routinely bar a
seller from lowering its prices to compete with a competitor's lower prices." Id. at
1283-84.
100. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1068 (1989).
101. Id. at 703.
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pos[ing] the motion." 10 2 After defining the relevant market as the
electric razor market, Windmere's expert estimated that Phillips/
Norelco razors' share of the rotary razor market was approximately
ninety percent. Windmere showed barriers to entry into the market
since the public demanded a recognized brand name. Windmere
also offered evidence that Phillips changed its policies in direct response to Windmere's entry stating "let's pound them into the sand"
and "kill this stone dead by introducing old models at very low
prices. "
Within two years Windmere was forced to withdraw
from the rotary shaver market.
The district court had directed a verdict in favor of the alleged
monopolist, stating that willful acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power was not proven because Windmere was not able to
show that Phillips was charging a price below its average variable
cost. 104

The Federal Circuit concluded, however, that the district court
took too narrow a view of the kind of evidence that will support this
"intent" element of monopolization. Citing Aspen Skiing 10 s to support its proposition, the Federal Circuit stated "[e]vidence that a firm
holding ninety percent of a market that has substantial entry barriers, drastically slashing its prices in response to the competition of a
new entrant, is sufficient to show monopolization, including a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act."' 1 6 Therefore, a directed verdict is improper and legitimate questions of fact as to advertising
allocation and average fixed and variable costs must go to a jury.
This case stands out as one of the rare times that the Federal Circuit
has vigorously applied the antitrust laws and held that there was, or
may be, an antitrust violation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from this substantive analysis that the Federal Circuit
has been asked to rule on a variety of antitrust claims and the court
has consistently, with rare exceptions, ruled in favor of the alleged
monopolist.' 0 7 Earlier this year in the case of Atari v. Nintendo,"°s
102. Id. at 702 (quoting Gregory v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 764 F.2d
1437, 1440 (1lth Cir. 1985)).
103. Id. at 703.
104. Id. at 701 (quoting International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.,
517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976)).
105. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610
(1985) (monopoly act is illegal if its sole motivation was to harm a competitor with
no efficiency justification). See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781 (1946).
106. Phillips,861 F.2d at 704.
107. But see Phillips, 861 F.2d 695, supra notes 100-106. The Federal Circuit
reversed a directed verdict in favor of the monopolist and remanded the case for a
jury to determine whether or not an antitrust violation occurred. Even in this case,
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the Federal Circuit stated that "patent owners may incur antitrust
liability for enforcement of a patent known to be obtained through
fraud, or known to be invalid, where license of a patent compels the
purchase of unpatented goods, or where there is an overall scheme
to violate the antitrust laws."' 0 9 However, while the court may reiterate the applicable law and cite antitrust precedents, the Federal
Circuit does not normally find violations of the antitrust laws.
While this may be due to the inherent bias of patent judges, or
even a remarkable coincidence, one must consider that, due to the
jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit will only hear antitrust
claims that are pendent to patent claims. 110 These two bodies of law
must be carefully balanced together and their goals reconciled. In
light of the current trends in antitrust enforcement, such a one sided
result could be expected.
During the 1980's, antitrust enforcement was significantly relax,.A
and intellectual property protections were expanded. Throughout
the existence of the Federal Circuit, all branches of government
have become more lenient toward antitrust violations. First, the
principal antitrust enforcer, the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice, has reevaluated important antitrust policies-especially
regarding intellectual property.1 1 1 In addition, Congress has
adopted new and stronger intellectual property protections, including permitting some monopolistic behavior. 1 2 Finally, even the
courts, including the Supreme Court, have been careful to respect
the balance between antitrust laws and the intellectual property
laws. 113
During this decade there was a change in the focus of antitrust
enforcement and the methods used to achieve it. Moreover, experts
have realized that the antitrust goals and the intellectual property
discipline are not opposites, but are actually complements, both
aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition. 1 4 The
the Federal Circuit did not find an antitrust violation, but rather, found only that
enough evidence existed to submit this claim to a jury.
108. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1990), reh. den, No. 5205 (U.S. App. Apr. 4, 1990)(LEXIS, Gened library).
109. Id. at 1576-77.
110. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
111. During the 1980's, a series of important statutes were adopted which
strengthened or expanded existing intellectual property -protections (see supra note
95 and accompanying text). "In each instance, rather than assuming its typical role
as leader of the opposition, The [Antitrust] Division was one of the primary proponents." R. Andewelt, Antitrust Perspectiveon IntellectualPropertyProtections,30
Pat., Trademark, & Copyright J. (BNA) 319 (1985).
112. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
113. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965); Atari v. Nintendo, 897 F.2d 1572. See also Handguards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, cert. den., 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
114. Atari, 897 F.2d at 1576. See also Loctite, 781 F.2d at 876-77.
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Antitrust Division recognized that a different approach was necessary to maximize the benefits in a dynamic market economy for U.S.
consumers. Global competition has caused an increased awareness
of the benefits of high technology on the U.S. economy. Stronger
intellectual property protections are therefore necessary to foster
technological growth and industrial innovation."' Since the intended goal of intellectual property protection is to encourage competition by rewarding innovation, even the Antitrust Division has
been supportive of stronger intellectual property protection.
The Federal Circuit in Atari also stated, "the [sole] fact that a patent has been obtained does not wholly insulate the patent owner
from the antitrust laws."" ' 6 However, based on the history and jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit, and the current focus of antitrust
and intellectual property laws, it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit
will find an antitrust violation on a claim against an industry innovator holding a valid U.S. patent. The outcome of similar cases in the
future is almost as assured as a "heads I win, tails you lose,"
proposition.
Steven W Heller
115. See Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 350, 359 (1982). See also Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit,supra
note 4, at 27.
116. Atari, 897 F.2d at 1576.

